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Recommendations and Safety Advisory Notices

Recommendations and Safety Advisory Notices

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Central to ATSB's investigation of aviation accidents and incidents is the early identification of safety deficiencies in the civil aviation environment. While the Bureau issues recommendations to regulatory authorities, operators, manufacturers or other agencies in order to address safety deficiencies, its preference is for industry organisations to make safety enhancements during the course of an investigation. The Bureau is pleased to report positive safety action in its final reports instead of needing to make formal recommendations. Recommendations may be issued in conjunction with ATSB reports or independently. A safety deficiency may lead to a number of similar recommendations, each issued to a different agency.

The ATSB does not have the resources to carry out a full cost-benefit analysis of every recommendation. The cost of any recommendation must always be balanced against its benefits to safety, and aviation safety involves the whole community. Such analysis is a matter for the body to which the recommendation is addressed (for example the Civil Aviation Safety Authority in consultation with the industry).

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<< < > >>Page 1 of 81 - Total Records: 802
Reference
Number		Issue
Date		RecommendationOrganisation
MS2008002725-Sep-2008

Rexandra's electronic detectability was reduced because of the vessel's timber construction and the lack of a radar reflector or an AIS unit.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau advises that ship and fishing vessel owners, operators' masters/skippers and State/Northern Territory marine regulators should consider the safety implications of this safety issue and to take action where it is considered appropriate.

AO-2008-053-SAN-00629-Aug-2008The Australian Transport Safety Bureau encourages all organisations performing inspection, testing, maintenance and repair activities on aviation oxygen cylinders, to note the circumstances detailed in this preliminary report, with a view to ensuring that all relevant procedures, equipment, techniques and personnel qualifications satisfy the applicable regulatory requirements and established engineering best practices.
AO-2008-053-SAN-00729-Aug-2008The Australian Transport Safety Bureau encourages other operators of transport category aircraft fitted with pressurised gaseous oxygen systems, to note the circumstances detailed in this preliminary report, with a view to ensuring that all oxygen cylinders, and cylinder installations, are maintained in full accordance with the relevant manufacturer's requirements, statutory regulations, and established engineering best practices.
AO-2007-006-SAN-03728-Aug-2008

Safety issue

Some pilots operating at non-towered aerodromes do not fully understand the significance of hearing (or not hearing) the various ARFU transmissions.

Australian Transport Safety Bureau

The safety issue does not only relate to members of Recreational Aviation Australia and as such the ATSB issues the following safety advisory notice to the broader aviation industry.

Safety Advisory Notice

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau advises that pilots operating into non-towered aerodromes should consider the safety implications of this safety issue and take action where considered appropriate.

RR2008003428-Aug-2008

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Australian Rail Track Corporation take action to address this safety issue.

Safety Issue

The railway 'Stop' sign assembly (RX-2 modified) for drivers entering Murrow Farm, was not located on the left side of the road to assist with driver familiarity and standard placement of signs as shown in Australian Standard AS 1742.7-2007.

RR2008003528-Aug-2008

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Australian Rail Track Corporation take action to address this safety issue.

Safety Issue

The railway 'Stop' sign assembly (RX-2 modified) positioned approximately 4.6 m from the nearest rail instead of nearer to 3.5 m as recommended in Australian Standard AS 1742.7, made it more difficult for the driver to gain a clear view of approaching trains.

RR2008003628-Aug-2008

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Australian Rail Track Corporation take action to address this safety issue.

Safety Issue

At the time of the accident the Australian Rail Track Corporation and the District Council of Mallala did not have an 'Interface Agreement' defining each organisation's responsibilities with respect to the maintenance of level crossings and land adjoining the rail corridor in the district.

RR2008003728-Aug-2008

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the District Council of Mallala take action to address this safety issue.

Safety Issue

At the time of the accident the District Council of Mallala and the Australian Rail Track Corporation did not have an 'Interface Agreement' defining each organisation's responsibilities with respect to the maintenance of level crossings and land adjoining the rail corridor in the district.

RR2008003220-Aug-2008

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Australian Rail Track Corporation take action to address this safety issue.

Safety Issue

Tree pruning and clearing works following the identification of a sighting hazard at the Murrow Farm level crossing in March 2007 were not completed within 28 days in accordance with the original assessment and priority maintenance specification.

RR2008003320-Aug-2008

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Australian Rail Track Corporation take action to address this safety issue.

Safety Issue

Downgrading of the ARTC Infrastructure Management System priority rating for sighting restoration work at the Murrow Farm level crossing, in this case from 28 days to 180 days, without a reassessment of the status of vegetation at the level crossing and its effect on sighting distances, increased the risk of a collision.
<< < > >>Page 1 of 81 - Total Records: 802
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Last Updated: 24 November, 2006